Introduction
This paper examines the effects of taxes and keiretsu affiliation on income-shifting among Japanese firms. Prior tax research has focused primarily on shifting income between jurisdictions rather than between differentially taxed entities within the same jurisdiction [Beatty and Harris (2001) , Mills and Newberry (2001) , Dhaliwal (2001), and Collins et al. (1998) ]. 1 But advisory materials are replete with planning suggestions for shifting income between entities that face different tax rates within the same jurisdiction [Scholes et al. (2002) ]. In this paper, we investigate the extent that, relative to independent firms, keiretsu members capitalize on their affiliations by shifting both financial and taxable income among group members to lower overall effective tax rates.
The keiretsu business form represents a significant portion of one of the world's major economies. Viewed as a formidable barrier to entry into the Japanese market, keiretsu members benefit from distribution and production arrangements, dominant access to markets, and low-cost flexible financing. In fiscal year 1997 (the final year of our 21-year study period), a total of 1,245 companies belong to six keiretsu groups under study, with the combined paid-in capital accounting for approximately 20 percent of the total amount for Japan. Keiretsu annual sales account for over 17 percent of total sales in Japan, while their combined profits are 8.4 percent of the total profits of Japanese corporations. 2 A large number of empirical studies investigate the financial benefits of keiretsu group affiliation, though we believe this paper is the first to investigate the tax savings of 1 A recent notable exception is Yetman's (2001) study of nonprofit organizations' allocation of expenses between taxable and tax-exempt activities, as reported in tax returns. Yetman's research considers income shifting between related nonprofit entities' tax returns, and, given the setting, does not examine the effect of tax motivation on shifting financially reported income among entities.
2 These figures pertain to the six major horizontal keiretsu that are the subjects of this study. They consist of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuji, Sanwa, and Dai-ichi Kangyo, most of which have their origins in the 1950s [Nakatani (1984) ]. The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) lists approximately 250 core members and 280 other related firms [Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1985 ]. Throughout the paper, the term "keiretsu" refers to these horizontal groups, leaving the study of income shifting within vertical keiretsu groups for future research.
keiretsu membership and, specifically, the possible shifting of income among affiliates to reduce overall effective tax rates. 3 The existence of important keiretsu groups, with firms organizing around a main bank and related financial institutions, provides a unique setting for testing the effect of corporate group affiliation on the propensity to shift income between taxpayers for tax-mitigating purposes. Given that keiretsu firms are subject to lower effective tax rates than independent firms, we hypothesize that income-shifting is one reason for this observation. To provide evidence in support of our hypothesis, we examine the interactive effect of keiretsu membership and a marginal tax rate proxy on pretax return on firm value. 4 Compared with independent firms, keiretsu firms' pretax return on firm value is inversely related to the marginal tax rate proxy. The evidence is robust to alternative variable definitions, model specifications, and time periods.
Our empirical evidence has strong policy implications. Most important, the evidence suggests that unbridled tax incentives for income shifting bias the publicly reported financial statements of Japanese keiretsu members. Relative to a control group of non-keiretsu firms, keiretsu firms facing positive marginal tax rates appear to shift income to keiretsu firms not facing positive marginal tax rates. Thus, financial statement users not fully considering a keiretsu firm's tax situation, and its capability and willingness to shift income, face increased difficulty in assessing its corporate performance. Both cross-sectional and cross-temporal comparisons are problematic. The challenge is particularly acute among the Presidents' Council members within each of keiretsu groups; they exhibit more income-shifting behavior than other keiretsu members.
Interestingly, the evidence of income shifting increases in intensity through Japan's economic recession of the 1990s. This final observation may seem counter-intuitive because the Japanese government has been tightening its regulatory grip over keiretsu firms through its Fair Trade
Commission's anti-monopoly policies. Further, ad hoc evidence suggests that keiretsu affiliations have been weakening as the economic recession has deepened in the 1990s. 5 However, keiretsu firms may have capitalized on the recession's effects (i.e., corporate losses) by engaging in income-shifting activities to reduce overall keiretsu effective tax rates. We also conjecture that prior to the recession the Japanese government generously distributed special tax breaks to keiretsu-affiliated companies but these allowances began to disappear with the introduction of a broader-base, lower-rate corporate tax system in 1990 [Ishi (1993) ]. With special tax breaks having disappeared and effective tax rates rising, keiretsu firms appear to have used their affiliations to capitalize on the recession's losses by shifting income among keiretsu members.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We develop the income-shifting hypothesis within keiretsu groups in Section 2. In Section 3 we illustrate relative tax burdens of keiretsu group members and independent firms using an effective tax rate measure. We test the income-shifting hypothesis in Section 4 with a multiple regression approach that explains pretax return on firm value using keiretsu affiliation, a marginal tax rate proxy, and several control variables. Summary and conclusions are offered in the final section.
Income-Shifting within Keiretsu Groups
Keiretsu or industrial groupings represent diversified groups of manufacturing and trading firms that share the same financial institutions and adopt homogenous business strategies.
Keiretsu members usually come from a variety of industries, and they are linked through various relationships, including cross-ownership, mutual appointment of officers and directors, intra-group financing, and formation of presidential councils. Beyond extensive cross-shareholdings within the keiretsu group, the most distinctive institutional feature is the main bank relationship [Miyashita and Russell (1994) ]. Serving as the central unit of each keiretsu group, the main bank acts as a major lender as well as a major shareholder of its respective group members [Berglöf and Perotti (1994) ]. At the end of fiscal year 1997, banks owned approximately 15 percent of listed nonfinancial companies while listed companies held over 40 percent of banking shares, which compares with 16.5 percent and 45 percent, respectively in 1990 [Brown & Company Ltd. (1999) ].
This ownership structure also enables main banks to assign personnel to top managerial positions of member companies, which, in turn, allows the banks to exercise power as both lenders and shareholders. 6 Financial economists have documented a number of advantages of belonging to a keiretsu group. 7 For instance, keiretsu membership reduces the cost of financial distress [Suzuki and Wright (1985) ; Hoshi et al. (1990) ]. In addition, the keiretsu governance structure resolves agency problems by reducing information asymmetry [Prowse (1990 [Prowse ( , 1992 and Hoshi et al. (1991) ], and provides effective monitoring over top management [Berglöf and Perotti (1994) , Kaplan (1994) , and Kaplan and Minton (1994) ]. Consequently, keiretsu companies maintain higher financial leverage than independent firms [Hodder and Tschoegl (1985) ] and firm diversification is more valuable to keiretsu firms than to independent firms [Guo et al. (2001) ]. At the same time, keiretsu firms' investment decisions are less constrained by liquidity issues [Hoshi et. al. (1991) ], and keiretsu membership has been observed to substantially reduce bankruptcy costs [Hoshi et al. (1990) ]. 8 Kester (1991) argues that business/trading relationships among keiretsu companies are 6 A number of independent firms also maintain a primary bank relationship and borrow from one of six major city banks [Campbell and Hamao (1994) and Horiuchi and Okazaki (1992) ]. However, the corporate governance systems of independent firms are completely different from, and much less complex than, those of keiretsu firms that have intense interactions among numerous constituents [Gilson and Roe (1993) , Prowse (1992) , and Sheard (1989) ]. Therefore, it is only in keiretsu groups where main banks share the benefits of affiliation with their members.
7 Some pessimistic views on this point, however, have been expressed in prior studies. For example, Beason (1998) concludes that the capital market behavior of keiretsu and independent firms' securities, as measured by equity price volatility, does not appear to systematically differ. The apparent lack of different capital market behavior implies that the distinction between the two groups may be operationally meaningless in terms of the fundamental behavior of Japanese firms.
8 Alternative interpretations of the literature cast a more critical view of the keiretsu financial system. It has been suggested that Jensen's (1986 Jensen's ( , 1989 value-destroying hypothesis, in which managers who control free cash flow are predicted to manage it inefficiently, is consistent with this view. In addition, a number of studies suggest that close bank relationships lead to lower growth and profitability [Lincoln et al. (1993) ]. Because of their primary interest in securing as important as financial relationships between banks and keiretsu members. In fact, crossshareholding among member firms fosters mutual monitoring and information sharing among corporate members [Gilson and Roe (1993) ].
With a focus on overall keiretsu wealth rather than on each firm's bottom line, keiretsu members have incentives to mitigate the organization's overall tax liability. As in the United States, except for the limited availability of loss carryovers, profitable firms pay tax while unprofitable firms do not receive tax rebates. 9 Thus, when two or more related companies act in concert they can mitigate their overall tax liability by shifting income from a profitable firm to a loss firm, presumably by using non-market-value transfer prices. We borrow a concept introduced by Harris et al. (1993) and Harris (1993) to suggest that keiretsu membership affords firms flexibility (i.e. less "frictions")
in reducing their effective tax rates through income shifting. 10 These studies measure flexibility in terms of the level of expenses, relative to total assets or sales, that represents operations that are apparently easy to shift across jurisdictions (i.e., research and development, interest, advertising, and, in the Harris study, rent). The cooperative nature of Japanese keiretsu firms provides a comparative measure of income-shifting flexibility: whether the firm is a member of one of the six dominant keiretsu groups. 11 payment of principal and interest, banks may prevent firms from investing in risky but profitable projects. Keiretsu affiliation also allows banks to charge relatively higher interest rates in exchange for readily accessible bank loans [Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) ].
9 See Shevlin (1990) for further discussion of the asymmetric treatment of income and loss and the estimation of marginal tax rates considering loss carryovers. Japanese corporate taxpayers that maintain certain accounting records (i.e., file "blue form" tax returns) are allowed to carry back losses to one preceding year [Article 81 of the Corporation Tax Law] and carry forward income to five succeeding years [Article 57 of the Corporation Tax Law] [Kuboi (1991, p. 47) ]. However, the one-year loss carryback rule was suspended between 1984 between and 1988 between and again between 1992 between and 2000 between . Also, between 1986 and 1988 the loss carryforward rule required taxpayers to wait two years before offsetting current income with prior losses [Kuboi (1991, p. 34) ]. Asymmetric taxation of gains and losses, combined with the limited availability of loss carryovers, explains some of the variation in effective tax rates across Japanese companies. Further variation in effective tax rates is due to the imposition of local income taxes that differ depending on prefecture and municipality [Kuboi (1991, pp. 44-45)] and to the varying availability of tax-free reserves across firm size, industry membership, and nature and amount of investment [Ishi (1993, pp. 201-203) ].
10 Refer to Scholes et al. (2002) for an explanation of the conceptual terms "frictions" and "restrictions."
11 Gupta and Mills (2001) and Rego (2001) empirically determine that effective tax rates are statistically related to the number of states and countries, respectively, in which a firm operates. Gupta and Mills explain that up to a point (i.e., 24 states) corporate effective tax rates are positively related to the number of states that a firm operates within, but that this
In the U.S. a tax-induced income-shifting scheme based on transfer prices would be deemed improper by Internal Revenue Code Section 482, which requires that transactions between related taxpayers be recorded at arms' length prices. Japan has a similar law but it only applies to transactions between Japanese companies and their overseas affiliates; transactions between domestic Japanese companies are specifically exempted from this legislation [Kuboi (1991, p. 86) ]. 12 Thus, the Japanese government has apparently not exerted substantial effort to restrict income-shifting schemes that reduce the overall tax burdens of cooperating firms.
In an early empirical study of tax-induced income shifting, Harris et al. (1993) obtain evidence to support their hypothesis that firms transfer income to (from) the United States when their foreign operations are located in countries with higher (lower) tax rates than in the United
States. Harris (1993) reports that US multinational companies shifted income into the United
States following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 when tax rates were cut substantially. Further, Harris finds that "flexible" firms, those with substantial rent, interest, research and development, and advertising expenses, react more quickly and completely than inflexible firms. Klassen et al. (1993) report evidence that US multinational firms shift income around the world in response to both domestic and foreign tax rate changes. Jacob (1996) examines a sample of US firms to determine whether the magnitude of intracompany cross-jurisdictional business is positively related to the propensity to shift income among corporate affiliates. Jacob's evidence supports the view that these firms shifted income through transfer pricing. Collins et al. (1998) determine that income-shifting by US multinational firms critically depends on the firm's position with respect to the foreign tax credit limit. Designed to prevent double taxation but insure at least one level of taxation, the foreign tax credit allows US firms to receive a tax credit for foreign taxes paid on foreign income; the limitation prevents the credit from exceeding the US tax on the foreign income. Because of the foreign tax credit limit, corporations. In an effort to explain how firms shift income across jurisdictions, Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001) show that tax incentives affect firms' location of debt issuances.
In spite of the incentives and the perceived flexibility for keiretsu firms to reduce their combined tax liabilities through income-shifting techniques, frictions might prevent this from happening on a widespread basis. Income-shifting involves a transfer of wealth (or at least the right to wealth) between two legal entities. To the extent that these firms are owned by different sets of shareholders, some of the different shareholders will benefit from the income shift while others will be harmed. Further, management performance evaluation is complicated by taxinduced income-shifting and keiretsu affiliations may be forced to create costly logistical mechanisms, including special accounting and dividend systems. 13 In summary, keiretsu member firms have strong incentives to shift income for tax purposes and they possess the flexibility to shift income through intra-keiretsu trade involving transfer prices.
Building on previous income-shifting research that pertains primarily to multinational American firms operating in different tax jurisdictions, this study provides evidence supporting the view that keiretsu member companies shift income among themselves to reduce the overall tax burden facing the keiretsu. In the next section we present effective tax rates and other descriptive statistics for the sample.
12 The Special Taxation Measures Law became effective on April 1, 1986.
13 Later, in the sensitivity analysis portion of the empirical results, we examine evidence concerning the possibility that shifted income is returned to the transferor via dividend payments. In Japan, an 80-percent (100-percent) dividends received deduction is available to offset dividends received from domestic corporations for which the recipient owns 25 percent or less (more than 25 percent). For further information, see Japanese Ministry of Finance (1999) and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International (1996) .
Relative Tax Burdens of Keiretsu and Independent Firms
The sample employed in this study contains all non-financial and non-utility firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which data is available during the 21-year period from 1977-1997. 14 Financial statement data are retrieved from the PACAP database™ compiled by the Sandra Ann 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms
We classify sample firms into two categories, keiretsu member firms and independent firms, based on the information in Industrial Groupings in Japan published by Dodwell Marketing
Consultants (1985, 1989, and 1995) and Brown & Company Ltd (1999) . Independent firms are those not identified as members of one of the six largest horizontal keiretsu groups. We further organize keiretsu firms into two subgroups, strong ties and weak ties, based on the degree of It appears, however, the total number of shares held by the top ten shareholders is the most important variable considered. Industrial Groupings in Japan assigns a four-star rating to nucleus companies, a three-star rating to companies with group shareholding (by the ten largest shareholders) greater than 50 percent; a two-star rating to companies with group shareholding between 30 and 50 percent; and a one-star rating to companies with group shareholding of less than 30 percent. Based on this information, we classify keiretsu firms with three-and four-star ratings as having strong ties to the keiretsu group and companies with one-and two-star ratings as indicating weak ties to the group.
Descriptive statistics are computed for the 21-year study period as well as two subperiods: 1977-1989 and 1990-1997 . Beginning in 1990, Japan's economy experienced a decade-long economic recession. Relative to the recession period, the first subperiod is characterized by robust economic growth and expansion in Japan. Two important developments occurred toward the end of the first subperiod: the amendment to the Anti-Monopoly Act became effective in 1987 and the Tax Reform Law of 1988 was enacted. 15 , 16 The year 1990 marks the beginning of a gradual weakening of keiretsu group affiliations as the Anti-Monopoly Act became a driving force for changes in Japanese industrial organization and as other reform measures were enforced in the Japanese banking and corporate sectors. Table 1 summarizes cross-sectional mean and median statistics for gross profit measure, pre-tax return, after-tax operating return, tax expense, financial leverage, firm value, and total assets. Pre-tax return, after-tax operating return, and tax expense are shown relative to firm value, which is defined as the sum of the market value of outstanding equity plus the book value of total liabilities for all sample firms. Gross profit measure is the ratio of gross profits to sales. Financial leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to firm value. The sample firms are grouped into keiretsu firms, either strong-tie or weak-tie, and independent firms. 17 Results of statistical tests of the differences between each of the keiretsu groups and the independent firms are presented. Panel [Insert Table 1] Gross profit measure, pre-tax return on firm value and after-tax operating return on firm value are all significantly lower among keiretsu firms than independent firms, and this difference persists across both the pre-recession and recession periods (p<.0001). Strong-tie keiretsu firms report lower profit measures than weak-tie keiretsu members, across the entire period as well as each subperiod. Possible reasons for lower profitability among keiretsu firms include, among others, market penetration objectives that dominate profit objectives, or a lack of financial discipline on managers to provide the same return on investment required by managers of independent firms. Consistent with lower profitability among keiretsu firms, tax expense relative to firm value is lower for all keiretsu firms and the least for strong-tie keiretsu firms. From a macroeconomic point of view, both investors and the government reap smaller returns, per yen invested, from keiretsu firms than from independent firms. One way to estimate the average keiretsu tax advantage is to subtract the mean keiretsu tax rate on firm value, 0.012, from the independent firm rate, 0.0157, and multiply the difference by the mean firm value of keiretsu firms, ¥300.3 billion.
This produces an estimated mean keiretsu annual tax savings of ¥1.11 billion or roughly $9.25 million. 18 Financial leverage is consistently higher among keiretsu firms than independent firms across the whole period as well as each of the two subperiods.
Keiretsu firms' mean firm value is nearly ¥21 billion larger (about 7 percent) than the mean firm value of independent firms. Strong-tie keiretsu firms, with firm value averaging ¥395 billion (approximately $3.3 billion) are more than twice as large as weak-tie keiretsu firms and nearly 42 percent larger than independent firms (see Panel A). Overall keiretsu mean pre-and after-tax returns on firm value are 2.18 percent and 0.99 percent, respectively, compared with 2.75 percent and 1.28 percent for independent firms across the whole period (Panel A). Keiretsu firms, 18 We use ¥120=$1 as a rough estimate of the exchange rate across the entire sample period.
particularly those with strong ties, are larger and less profitable than independent firms though these differences dissipate sharply when the recession arrives.
Comparing the overall mean firm value, ¥285.9 billion, to the mean book value of total assets, ¥196.2 billion, reveals that the ratio of the estimated market value of firm assets to the balance sheet value of assets is 1.46. As expected, this ratio declined from 1.53 before the Japanese stock market "bubble" burst in 1990 to 1.39 afterward (see Panels B and C).
Corporate Effective Tax Rates
Our initial objective is to understand the relative tax burdens facing keiretsu and independent firms, and to see how these burdens differ across time, firm size, and industry. For this purpose only, we examine effective tax rates on cash flows to avoid possible taint arising from using income-shifted earnings in the denominator. 19 The effective tax rate on cash flows is defined as income tax divided by operating cash flow, where income tax is the sum of national tax (levied by central government), enterprise tax (levied by the prefecture), and inhabitant tax (levied by both prefectures and municipalities), and operating cash flow is the sum of net operating income, other revenue/expense items, depreciation, prior-year current assets and current-year current liabilities, minus the sum of current-year current assets and prior-year current liabilities. We retrieve tax data from the PACAP-Japan Financial Statement file. 20 Table 2 presents cross-sectional mean and median effective tax rates for keiretsu and independent firms for the whole period as well as for the two subperiods. 21 Effective tax rates for keiretsu firms with strong and weak ties are also reported. Overall, there is strong evidence that keiretsu firms have lower effective tax rates than independent firms. During the study period, the median effective tax rate is 23.8 percent for keiretsu firms and 29.1 percent for independent firms (p<.0001). During the pre-recession period, the difference between the two groups' median effective tax rates is 5.7 percent (p<.0001) but this difference falls to 4.9 percent (p<.0001) in the recession period. This implies erosion of the special tax breaks garnered by keiretsu firms in the latter period following the complete introduction of tax reform measures in 1990. 22 [Insert Table 2] As expected, keiretsu firms with strong ties exhibit much lower median effective tax rates than firms with weak ties [19.9 percent versus 28.1 percent] during the 21-year study period.
Across both subperiods, strong-tie keiretsu firms face lower effective tax rates than independent firms. Not surprisingly, however, the differences between keiretsu firms with weak ties and independent firms are not as pronounced as those between strong tie keiretsu firms and independent firms.
Firm Size and Industry Effects
Zimmerman (1983) provides evidence that, relative to small firms, large U.S. firms incur higher effective tax rates, and hypothesizes that this is due to higher political costs that large companies may incur. 23 Specifically, if keiretsu firms are, on average, smaller than independent firms, it is possible that keiretsu firms' lower effective tax rates may be attributed to a difference in firm size between keiretsu and independent firms. Panel A of Table 1 indicates that total assets and firm value of keiretsu firms are greater than those reported by independent firms whereas the market value of shareholders' equity is smaller for keiretsu firms than independent firms (not reported). 24 To examine the differences in effective tax rates between keiretsu and independent firms with the minimum possible confounding effect of firm size, all sample firms are ranked in ascending order by firm value and then grouped into ten deciles (1 st decile = smallest; 10 th decile = largest). We compute the mean and median effective tax rate, as well as the mean firm value, for keiretsu and independent firms within each of the ten deciles. Table 3 presents the results. Keiretsu firms exhibit lower mean and median effective tax rates than independent firms throughout the whole period as well as during both subperiods, Firm size differentials between keiretsu and independent firms are statistically insignificant in each of the 10 decile columns with the exception of the 10 th decile. Overall, median effective tax rates are significantly lower for keiretsu firms across most size levels and, generally speaking, keiretsu and independent firms are both fairly well dispersed across most of the size categories.
[Insert Table 3] Industry effects may also explain differences in effective tax rates between keiretsu and independent firms. Kern and Morris (1992) observe a strong association between effective tax rates and industry classification using U.S. data. Thus, it may be plausible that keiretsu companies are more clustered in certain industries where government tax subsidies and different forms of tax breaks are readily available, which, in turn, could influence our results. Table 4 shows the average effective tax rates of keiretsu and independent firms within major industries classified by Tokyo Stock Exchange industry codes (similar to the four-digit standard industry classification). Effective tax rates vary across industries, with food, wholesale and retail, construction, and service industries exhibiting higher tax rates than others. Within each industry, however, keiretsu firms exhibit lower effective tax rates than independent firms. Some exceptions are observed as indicated by positive differences for some industries (e.g. real estate & financial and transportation, communications, & utilities), but these differences are not statistically significant. In addition, the notion that keiretsu companies may be concentrated more in low-tax industries than independent 24 The mean values of equity are ¥125.5 billion for keiretsu firms and ¥180.9 billion for independent firms. firms is not supported by the results in Table 4 . For example, keiretsu firms do not dominate the low-tax industries such as real estate/financial, transportation, communications, utilities, and textile industries. These findings indicate that industry effects alone cannot explain lower effective tax rates observed for keiretsu firms. Overall, it does not appear that the keiretsu tax advantage is explained by firm size or industry membership. The next section considers the possibility that keiretsu firms use income-shifting as a vehicle for lowering effective tax rates.
[Insert Table 4 ]
Empirical Evidence on the Keiretsu Income-Shifting Hypothesis

Model
The effective tax rates portrayed in Tables 1-4 identify the overall tax burdens incurred by different groups, but effective tax rates are not likely to be useful for estimating the tax cost of earning additional income. For this, the marginal tax rate is appropriate as it is generally defined as the change in the present value of cash paid to tax authorities as a result of earning one additional currency unit [Scholes et al. (2002) ]. In corporations, the primary issue in estimating marginal tax rates is the valuation of the net operating loss (NOL) deduction [Shevlin (1999) ]. Thus, the value of the NOL depends on its magnitude, the amounts of current and future taxable income, the number and timing of the years for which carryover is statutorily permitted, the tax rate in the year in which the NOL deduction is used, and the cost of capital. Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a) simulate future earnings streams in order to estimate corporate marginal tax rates. Although the evidence indicates that these simulation procedures generally perform well, Graham (1996b) [Kuboi (1991, p. 34) ]. Thus, we assume that firms face positive marginal tax rates in 1986 (1987) if positive pretax income exceeds the sum of net losses for 1983 and 1984 (1984 and 1985) .
An OLS multiple regression model is employed to examine the differential relation between firm profitability and our marginal tax rate proxy given that firms are either independent or affiliated with a keiretsu. This model is motivated by Collins et al. (1998) 
for each firm i and year t. The dependent variable, PTAXROV, is the ratio of pretax income to firm value (i.e., the sum of equity market value and debt book value); X is the binomial marginal tax rate proxy (1 for firms facing positive marginal tax rates based on the assumptions described above; 0 otherwise); K is a dummy variable (1 for keiretsu firms; 0 for independent firms); SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to among the variables. In addition to PTAXROV, another profitability measure, the ratio of gross profits to sales (GPPCT), is introduced in Table 5 because GPPCT is examined as an alternative dependent variable in the sensitivity analysis. In general, relation between size and debt-to-book value of equity but no significant relation between size and debt-to-market value of equity. The negative correlation between financial leverage and profitability measures is not surprising, but its magnitude is unexpectedly large. 27
Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables
[Insert Table 5 ]
Regression Results
Panel A of Table 6 presents the regression results for the whole period , the pre-recession period (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) , and the recession period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) . The first column presents the results for the whole period and the last two columns summarize the results for the two subperiods. In each column, regression results are reported for the entire sample as well as separately for keiretsu firms with strong and weak ties. 28 With adjusted Rsquares all exceeding .15 and highly significant F-statistics, the models provide strong explanations of the variation in PTAXROV. The coefficient of LEVERAGE is highly significant and negative in the whole period as well as in the two subperiods, indicating that high financial leverage implies low profitability. Although conventional wisdom dictates that high profitability should be associated with high risk (as well as high financial leverage as one of major determinants of systematic risk), the large negative relation between firm profitability and financial leverage is not surprising in view of the Japanese banking practices in the past. 29 Traditionally, 27 We compute the correlations between financial leverage and PTAXROV for the population of U.S. Compustat active industrial companies for the years 1977 through 1997. Pearson and Spearman correlations are -0.063 and -0.064, respectively, which are much smaller in their magnitude than the counterpart figures estimated for our sample firms, -0.218 and -0.361 reported in Panel B. This preliminary evidence suggests that Japanese lenders are less concerned with (or less successful in predicting) the future profitability of their debtors.
Japanese banks continue to lend to their corporate customers even if borrowing firms suffer from operating losses to avoid corporate bankruptcies. 30 Only recently with severe economic recession, Japanese banks attempt to minimize this type of relationship-based banking practices. The impact of firm size on firm profitability is significantly negative in the pre-recession period, while it becomes insignificant in the recession period.
[Insert Table 6] Controlling for industry median pre-tax return on firm value, industry, year, and size and financial leverage effects, keiretsu firms exhibit tax-mitigating income-shifting behavior as indicated by the whole-period negative coefficient of -0.0123 associated with the interaction term K i *X t (p<.0001). This negative coefficient reveals evidence that keiretsu membership obscures the positive relation between firm profitability and marginal tax status; it appears that keiretsu firms facing positive marginal tax rates shift income to those facing non-positive marginal tax rates.
Keiretsu firms with strong ties and those with weak ties offer an interesting contrast. Apparent income-shifting indicated by the estimated coefficient for the interaction term is more conspicuous for keiretsu firms with strong ties. 31 The results obtained for the two subperiod models are even more interesting. Overall, the coefficient of the interaction term more than doubles in absolute magnitude in the recession period (-0.0159, p<.0001), compared with the pre-recession period (-0.0078, p<.0001). Although the significant negative coefficient estimated for strong-tie firms decreases from -0.0114 (p<.0001) to -0.0186 (p<.0001) in the recession period (a 63% increase in absolute magnitude), the negative coefficient of weak-tie keiretsu firms decreases from -0.0042 (insignificant) in the pre-recession period to -0.0128 (p<.0001) during the recession, an increase of more than 204%. These results 30 Horiuchi and Shimizu (1998) report that the issuance of a large amount of subordinated debt allowed the Japanese major banks to credit supply despite the severity of equity capital depletion in the 1980s and 1990s.
31 As a sensitivity test, we run equation (1) without including the industry dummy variables since the industry effect is also captured by the industry median value of PTAXROV. The results are even stronger than with the industry dummy variables as indicated by significant and negative coefficients estimated for the interaction variable (Ki*Xt).
indicate that income-shifting among keiretsu firms was formerly concentrated among those with strong ties, and that income-shifting expands into weak-tie keiretsu firms during the recession.
Overall shifting becomes more intensive during the recession period than the pre-recession period.
The latter observation may appear counter-intuitive considering the overall trend of weakening affiliation of keiretsu groups. However, when more keiretsu firms suffered from operating losses in the recession period, keiretsu groups apparently organized to take advantage of their group affiliation to engage in aggressive income-shifting. The recession period also coincides with the tightening of the fiscal purse by the Japanese government and the conclusion of government subsidies that had previously been available to keiretsu firms. In contrast, during the pre-bubble period, no strong incentive existed among keiretsu firms for income-shifting. As Jensen (1989) points out, before the recession Japanese firms enjoyed readily available positive free cash flow and bank financing, and senior management engaged in excessive expansion and growth of their firms rather than cost-cutting and profit-maximization. From our evidence, it appears clear that possible weakening of keiretsu affiliation does not imply moderation of income-shifting activities among keiretsu firms. 32 Rather, keiretsu firms engage in income-shifting more aggressively during the economic recession. 33 In Panel B we report the results in which we narrow strong keiretsu firms to include only those companies that belong to the Presidents' Council of each keiretsu group. This Council is an institutionalized forum for communication among selected chief executives of keiretsu members [Gerlach (1992) ]. Because only inner group members are invited to participate in the Council, we expect more intensive income-shifting activities among these firms than across the broader group 32 Except for a reduction in significance from P < .0001 to P < .001 for weak-tie firms during the recession period, none of the significance levels reported in Table 6 for the test variable, Ki*Xt, changes when SIZE is alternatively defined as the natural log of the sum of equity market value and debt book value.
33 Table 4 indicates that the largest difference in effective tax rate occurs in the fishing, mining and forestry industry group. To examine the robustness of our results, we ran the primary regression analysis without including firms in these industries. The results are very similar to those reported in Table 6 , with strong significance across all years for strongtie firms and highly significant results in the recession period for strong-tie firms and overall. Note that there is no logical underpinning for excluding these firms from the sample as they clearly represent keiretsu firms.
of strong-tie keiretsu firms. 34 The following model is used for the test: 
The primary difference between the above model and regression model (1) Further analysis indicates that variation in Presidents' Council members' tax rates differs depending on keiretsu affiliation (see Table 7 ). Sumitomo and Fuij are apparently most effective at shifting income to mitigate income taxes while the Sanwa group appears least effective. For comparison, this table measures tax rates two ways: relative to cash flows and relative to firm value (i.e., the sum of equity market value and debt book value). When firm value is the tax rate deflator instead of cash flows, Fuji's apparent shifting effectiveness diminishes while Sumitomo's remains. The Sumitomo group's income shifting effectiveness is indicated by its member firms' low mean and median tax rates on both cash flows and firm value, and by the very small standard deviations of these tax rates.
[Insert Table 7 ]
Sensitivity Analyses
In the absence of proprietary information regarding their operational decisions, it is almost impossible to identify the vehicles that keiretsu member firms utilize for their income-shifting activities. Therefore, we conduct a set of admittedly broad-based tests that are likely to be refined by future corroborative studies. 36 Initially, we examine alternative dependent variables and find supporting results. First, we deflate earnings by book total assets rather than the market value of the firm. With this specification, the coefficient of K i *X t is -0.0212 (p<.0001) across the whole period. Second, we introduce an alternative definition of firm profitability, GPPCT: the ratio of gross profits to sales. The GPPCT variable only considers transfer prices of primary products and services within the manufacturing and distribution chain, whereas PTAXROV is a broader measure that captures all possible transfer prices, including, for examples, interest, rent, and advertising.
The underlying motivation for using GPPCT as the alternative dependent variable is to determine whether keiretsu group members rely on a wide variety of mechanisms beyond simple transfer pricing of products. If qualitative results of the regression with GPPCT differ from those reported in Table 6 , we may conclude that keiretsu firms utilize a broader set of transactions to facilitate income-shifting. The overall regression results with GPPCT as the dependent variable differ from those summarized in Table 6 . For example, only strong-tie keiretsu firms exhibit income-shifting activities in the pre-recession period (p<.05) and recession period (p<.05), while weak-tie keiretsu firms do not show any activities at all during the two subperiods. In the presence of much lower 36 Detailed results of these tests are available upon request from the authors.
significance level observed for strong-tie keiretsu firms only, we conjecture that keiretsu firms rely on many other income-shifting methods over and beyond a narrowly defined transfer pricing mechanism.
Second, we adopt a model to investigate the possibility that intra-keiretsu income-shifting activities remain unsettled by cash transfers at year-end. If income-shifting among keiretsu firms is not settled up in cash by year-end, tax-induced income-shifting will reduce the variation in tax expense relative to pretax cash flows. In other words, keiretsu firms' income-shifting activities will have a negative impact on the ratio of the time-series variation in income tax expense to the timeseries variation in pre-tax cash flows. The following model tests this possibility. 
where VTXCF is the firm-specific ratio of the time-series variation in income tax expense to the time-series variation of pre-tax cash flows; and K is a dummy variable that differs in definition depending on whether the model examines all keiretsu firms, strong-tie keiretsu firms, or weak-tie keiretsu firms. A negative and significant coefficient of dummy variable K is an indication of intrakeiretsu income shifting activities. The regression coefficients on the keiretsu dummy variable estimated for strong-tie keiretsu firms are significant and negative in the whole period and the recession period, but not during the pre-recession period, indicating the existence of intra-keiretsu income-shifting activities. The same coefficients are not significant for weak-tie keiretsu firms, which implies that this type of income-shifting may be limited to only strong keiretsu members.
Although one cannot isolate specific income-shifting mechanisms, the results provide some evidence of tax-lowering maneuvers among strong-tie keiretsu firms. 37 The last test is designed to investigate the existence of a compensatory dividend payment.
The underlying assumption is as follows: If a keiretsu member firm shifts income to another 37 Estimated coefficients for the test variable, K, are -0.0174 (P<.001) and -0.0145 (P<.05) in the whole period and the recession period, respectively, for strong-tie keiretsu firms, while the coefficient is insignificant in the pre-recession period. In contrast, none of the coefficients (K) estimated for weak-tie keiretsu firms is significant in any of the periods.
member firm, there must be some way the former should be compensated for the shifted income.
One variable we investigate is dividend payments in view of cross-shareholding practices especially among keiretsu firms. 38 In Japan, a firm owning more than (no more than) 25 percent of the outstanding shares of another company is entitled to a 100 percent (80 percent) dividendsreceived deduction for dividends received from the company (Japanese Ministry of Finance 1999). 39 The following model is used to test the hypothesis that keiretsu affiliation will directly impact the dividend policies of its member firms:
The estimated coefficient for the interaction, K i* X i , between the keiretsu dummy (K) and marginal tax status (X) is our major focus in this model. NETDIV is the ratio of dividend income to dividends paid and all other independent variables have been defined in previous regression models. A positive and significant coefficient of K i* X i would indicate greater net compensatory dividend income among keiretsu firms with positive marginal tax rates. In fact, the results confirm this. Across the whole period for all keiretsu firms, we observe a positive and significant coefficient on K i* X i of 0.1051 (p<.001). The results of this model are stronger for strong-tie keiretsu firms and non-existent for weak-tie keiretsu firms, indicating that compensatory dividends is a mechanism predominantly used by strong-tie keiretsu firms.
Conclusion
Many empirical papers have documented a variety of benefits to firms affiliated with keiretsu groups in Japan. In the finance arena, membership in the keiretsu system has been shown to reduce bankruptcy and agency costs, alleviate liquidity constraints, and control monitoring costs. This paper examines a tax-savings benefit that has not been previously been examined: the keiretsu system enables member companies to shift income within the affiliated group to pay lower overall taxes than independent companies.
Given our evidence that keiretsu firms are subject to lower effective tax rates than independent firms, we examine the relation between firm profitability and marginal tax status and find that this relation is negatively affected by the keiretsu membership. This supports the view that, relative to independent firms, keiretsu affiliates with relatively high tax rates shift income to affiliates with relatively low tax rates. The negative relation we find is strong especially during the second subperiod (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) characterized by economic recession, and it withstands alternative measures of both the key independent and dependent variables. Thus, the evidence strongly suggests that one benefit of keiretsu membership is the ability to shift income among group member companies. Contradicting conventional wisdom, we find that weakening of keiretsu affiliation during the recent economic recession does not imply less income-shifting among keiretsu firms. Rather, empirical evidence indicates that income-shifting emerges in full among strong-tie keiretsu firms during the recession.
39 Ad hoc evidence from a conversation with a Japanese accounting professor suggests that special dividends to certain shareholders are possible within keiretsu groups and that such dividends may result from the use of artificial transfer prices designed to mitigate income tax. 1997 (Panel C) . Gross profit measure is the ratio of gross profits to sales. Firm value is defined as the sum of the market value of outstanding equity plus the book value of total liabilities. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to firm value. Keiretsu and independent firm classification information is obtained from Industrial Groupings in Japan published by Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1985, 1989, 1995) and Brown & Company, Ltd. (1999) . Keiretsu firms are classified into two subgroups, strong ties and weak ties, based on the degree of affiliation intensity as defined by Dodwell Marketing Consultants and Brown & Company, Ltd. *, **, ***, and **** indicate two-sided significance levels of .05, .01, .001, and .0001, respectively, in comparisons of means using t-tests and medians using Wilcoxon rank sum tests. 1997 (Panel C) . The effective tax rate on pretax cash flow is income tax expense divided by cash flow, where cash flow is the sum of income from operations and other revenues and expenses, adjusted by adding depreciation expense, prior-year current assets and current-year current liabilities, and subtracting current-year current assets and prior-year current liabilities. Keiretsu and independent firm classification information is obtained from Industrial Groupings in Japan published by Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1985, 1989, 1995) and Brown & Company, Ltd. (1999) . Keiretsu firms are classified into two subgroups, strong ties and weak ties, based on the degree of affiliation intensity as defined by Dodwell Marketing Consultants and Brown & Company, Ltd. *, **, ***, and **** indicate two-sided significance levels of .05, .01, .001, and .0001, respectively, in comparisons of means using t-tests and medians using Wilcoxon rank sum tests. , the pre-recession period (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) , and the recession period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) , respectively. Keiretsu and independent firm classification information is obtained from Industrial Groupings in Japan published by Dodwell Marketing Consultants (1985, 1989, 1995) and Brown & Company, Ltd. (1999 ), and Kigyo Keiretsu Souran (1992 . Firm value is defined as the sum of the market value of outstanding equity plus the book value of total liabilities. The effective tax rate is defined as income tax expense divided by cash flow, where cash flow is the sum of income from operations and other revenues and expenses, adjusted by adding depreciation expense, prior-year current assets and current-year current liabilities, and subtracting current-year current assets and prior-year current liabilities. *, **, ***, and **** indicate two-sided significance levels of .05, .01, .001, and .0001, respectively, for t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests of within-quintile differences (∆K-I) in means and medians between keiretsu and independent firms. (1985, 1989, 1995) and Brown & Company, Ltd. (1999) . The effective tax rate is defined as income tax expense divided by cash flow, where cash flow is the sum of income from operations and other revenues and expenses, adjusted by adding depreciation expense, prior-year current assets and current-year current liabilities, and subtracting current-year current assets and prior-year current liabilities. Numbers of firm-year observations are shown in parentheses. **, * and d enote two-tail statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively, for t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests of within-industry differences (∆K-I) in means and medians between keiretsu and independent firms. Whole period (1977 Whole period ( -1997 Pre-Recession period (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) Recession period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) Consultants (1985 Consultants ( , 1989 Consultants ( , 1995 and Brown & Company, Ltd. (1999 ), and Kigyo Keiretsu Souran (1992 . X is a dummy variable indicating 1 if the firm faces a positive marginal tax rate and 0 otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total market value of equity; PTAXROV is pretax income divided by the sum of equity market value and debt book value; GPPCT is sales minus cost of sales, divided by sales; and LEVERAGE is the ratio of total liabilities to firm value. 
